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Abstract
Asset prices tend to cluster at round numbers. We examine betting exchange data
on U.K. horse races to establish whether limited cognition is partially responsible for
this clustering. The key tool in this study is the stark increase in cognitive load faced
by traders during races compared to prior to races. Using an approach that is part
regression discontinuity and part difference-in-differences, we find that traders exhibit
a substantially higher propensity to quote round numbers, rather than the nearest
non-round numbers, during races. This result is robust to a series of placebo tests.
JEL classification: G02, G12, G14
Keywords: Limited cognition, Price clustering, Regression discontinuity, Difference-in-differences
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1 Introduction
There is long-standing evidence that stock prices cluster at round numbers (e.g., Niederhoffer,
1965, 1966; Harris, 1991; Ahn, Cai, and Cheung, 2005; Sonnemans, 2006; Ikenberry and
Weston, 2007; Bhattacharya, Holden, and Jacobsen, 2012; Kuo, Lin, and Zhao, 2015). It is
unlikely that the fundamental values of stocks cluster at round numbers, and therefore —
at least recently, as models of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) have become more popular
in financial economics — price clustering has been attributed to limited cognition on the
part of traders. The story is that attention-constrained traders latch onto cognitive reference
points, such as round numbers, when they do not have the mental capacity to make finer
price distinctions.
Yet, if limited cognition is indeed causing price clustering, we should observe greater
(lower) levels of clustering when traders are more (less) cognitively constrained. In this
paper, we use a betting exchange in the United Kingdom as a unique laboratory to test this
hypothesis, and therefore more firmly establish the role of limited cognition in the clustering
of asset prices.
We examine Betfair betting exchange trading on the two major horse race meetings in
the U.K: Royal Ascot and the Cheltenham Festival. We compare the propensity for bettors
to quote odds at a range of round numbers with their propensity to quote odds at the nearest
non-round number. A round number and its nearest neighbor reflect almost identical win
probabilities: the only difference is that one price is arguably a cognitive reference point,
and therefore more likely to be quoted by the cognitively-constrained bettor, and the other
is not. Importantly, we compare these propensities prior to races, when there is little new
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information arriving, with the same propensities during races, when important information
on the relative positions of horses arrives in rapid succession. The idea is that bettors are
more likely to be cognitively constrained during races, when the cognitive load is greater.
We should therefore observe more round number quotes during races.
We find that bettors are substantially more likely to quote a round number than the
nearest non-round number during races, compared to prior to races. This result is perhaps
most vividly captured by Figure 1. This figure contains a simple bar chart of quoted odds
(including the stake) at Royal Ascot in 2011, both pre-race (in Panel A) and during races
(in Panel B). While there is some evidence that certain round numbers are quoted more
frequently than other odds prior to races, all round numbers are substantially more likely to
be quoted once races begin. This suggests that the cognitively constrained trader, forced to
process the rapid unfolding of each race, employs round numbers as a heuristic method for
pricing assets.
The logic of the empirical approach in this paper can be thought of as part regression
discontinuity (RD) design, and part difference-in-differences (DID). The decision to quote
a round number, or not, can be thought of as the "running" or "assignment" variable in a
RD. In common with RD analysis, we assume that horses quoted at a round number, or just
below, have almost identical characteristics (in this case, win probabilities). Therefore, in the
absence of cognitive constraints, the bettor should be equally likely to quote a round number
as its nearest neighbor. We are then interested in the extent to which the assignment decision
(i.e., quoting a round number) is determined by the treatment. In our setting, the treatment
is the running of each race and the increase in cognitive load faced by bettors. As with DID
analysis, we compare the propensity to quote a round number relative to its nearest neighbor
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prior to races (pre-treatment), with the same propensity during races (during the treatment).
We observe that the propensity to quote a round number compared to its nearest neighbor
substantially increases as the cognitive load of the bettor increases.
The setting for this study is chosen primarily for reasons of internal validity. To be specific,
the separation of activity into pre-race and in-running betting creates stark variation in the
cognitive load facing traders. Such variation would be more difficult to identify in many core
financial markets. That being said, the results obtained on the betting exchange can still
carry significant external validity. Betfair is the world’s largest betting exchange, with 11.8
million GBP in bets placed on a single race (The Grand National) in 2012 (Betfair Annual
Report 2012). Secondly, the market structure is a limit order book (more on this in Section
3), which is similar to that used in the majority of financial markets. Finally, the betting
exchange has been in operation since 2000, and while this does not guarantee that subjects
are experienced, this does at least give bettors the opportunity to have become familiar with
the market structure.
As asset price clustering is a form of mispricing, this work is related to a growing literature
on the effect of limited cognition on asset mispricing. This literature includes, among others,
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). These studies present
evidence to suggest that mispricing (i.e., the post-earnings announcement drift) is more
pronounced when traders are otherwise distracted, either because the weekend is imminent,
or because there are a large number of announcements on the same day.
In using betting exchange data — and the concentration of information arrival during
sporting events — we use a similar approach to that in Brown (2014). In that paper, Wimble-
don tennis betting data were used to establish the role that information processing constraints
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play in asset mispricing. Mispricing between two equivalent assets — a bet on a player to
win in one market, and a replicating portfolio of bets on the same player in another mar-
ket — increases substantially as information arrives during each tennis match. Part of the
reason for this increase is that information is not synchronously incorporated into the two
prices, thereby suggesting that information processing constraints are binding. In this paper,
we are interested in the effect of limited cognition on mispricing between one asset and its
fundamental value, rather than relative mispricing between two equivalent assets. "Absolute"
mispricing, considered in this paper, can be measured by the extent to which asset prices
cluster at round numbers.
While limited cognition is now arguably the dominant explanation for the clustering of
asset prices at round numbers, ours is the first paper (to our knowledge) to show that the
frequency of round number quotes increases when traders are subject to a greater cognitive
load. In part, we are able to make this contribution due to the great contrast between the
amount of information that needs to be processed during horse races, compared to prior to
races. While earnings announcements and other announcements may increase the cognitive
load on financial market traders, the contrast between these trading periods and other periods
is less stark, as financial information arrives in an almost continuous fashion.
In addition, we also argue that our setting allows us to distinguish between different
channels through which limited cognition may lead to round number prices. On the one
hand, round numbers may arise due to the cognitive limitations of the trader who originally
proposes the price. Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2015) show that traders on the Taiwan Futures
Exchange who frequently quote round numbers are amongst the worst performers (in terms
of trading profits). This suggests that traders’ own cognitive limitations lie behind their
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predilection for round number quotes. On the other hand, round numbers may be used as
a "trick" by one set of traders to induce orders from other cognitively constrained traders.
Bhattacharya, Holden, and Jacobsen (2012) find pronounced selling at round numbers and
pronounced buying just below these round numbers, suggesting a "left-digit bias" (see Section
2) that can be exploited by traders if they quote round numbers. To distinguish between
these two channels, the variation in cognitive load — pre-race versus in-running — in our
setting is again useful. During horse races (when the cognitive load is greater), we observe a
greater propensity to quote round numbers, but not a greater propensity to order at round
numbers. Our analysis therefore suggests that round number quotes arise more often because
of the cognitive limitations of the trader who proposes the price, rather than the trader that
takes the price.
The rest of the paper is ordered as follows. In Section 2 we provide some psychological
foundations for the analysis and survey the relevant economic literature. In Section 3 we
describe the data, and in Section 4 we present the main analysis. In Section 5 we describe a
series of robustness tests, and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Psychological foundations
In this paper we test whether an increase in the cognitive load facing traders — stimulated
by the arrival of information during each race — increases the probability that traders quote
round numbers. The designation of round numbers as "cognitive reference points," likely to
be latched on to by traders when they are cognitively constrained, is motivated by the work
of Rosch (1975).
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Rosch (1975) conducted a series of experiments, one of which showed that non-round
numbers are evaluated in the context of their relation to round numbers. The experimental
method was to give subjects a statement with blanks, such as _ is essentially _. Subjects
would then be given two numbers to fill the blanks, one a round number such as 1000, and
the other a non-round number such as 996. If 1000 was seen as the cognitive reference point,
we should observe more subjects returning the statement "996 is essentially 1000" than the
opposite statement. This was indeed the result that was found. To ensure the robustness of
the results, Rosch also asked the same question with two non-round numbers and found that
the two numbers were equally likely to be placed in either space.1
Later in this paper we attempt to establish whether round numbers are used by cognitively
constrained traders as a heuristic method for pricing assets, or are used to take advantage of
the cognitive limitations of their potential trading counterparty. For example, those ordering
at quotes already in the limit order book may exhibit what is termed, at least in the economics
literature if not the psychology literature, the "left-digit bias." The identification of this bias
is based on the work of Hinrichs, Yurko, and Hu (1981) and Poltrock and Schwartz (1984),
who found that subjects evaluate numbers sequentially, focusing on the left digit first. A
cognitively constrained subject, therefore, may not get around to evaluating the second and
third digits. The implication for our setting is that there may be a jump in the probability
that a bettor places an order at odds of 2, compared to 1.99, but no such jump in the
1We are not aware of any study in experimental psychology that examines whether the propensity to
choose the round number as the cognitive reference point is affected by the amount of time pressure that
subjects are under. Even if there were such a study, we may wish to see whether this effect also occurs in an
economic setting (e.g., the betting market in our project).
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probability of an order at odds of 2.02 compared to 2. It is possible that bettors quote a
higher proportion of round numbers during races as this is when their potential counterparty
is subject to a greater cognitive load, and therefore more likely to exhibit such a left-digit
bias. We will test this hypothesis in Section 5.
There is in fact quite prominent evidence consistent with a left-digit bias in other economic
settings. For example, one explanation for the prevalence of 99 cents (pence) pricing is that
consumers concentrate on the left digit, so, for example, a $1.99 product is regarded as
disproportionately cheaper than a $2 product (Ginzberg, 1936). More recently, Lacetera,
Pope, and Syndor (2012) and Busse et al. (2013) identified a left-digit bias in the used car
market. They observed large discontinuities in the prices of cars depending on the number
of miles driven. For example, there were large drops in the price of a car once it hit 10,000
miles. Lacetera, Pope, and Syndor (2012) also conducted a placebo test using Canadian data,
where distance is calculated in kilometers, and found a similar discontinuity at the 10,000
kilometer mark. Car owners, in the U.S. at least, appear to respond to this bias by bringing
a sizeable number of cars with just less than 10,000 miles on the odometer to the market.
3 Data
The data in this study are taken from Betfair, a betting exchange based in the U.K. The
exchange allows bettors to bet on, or against, a horse to win. Bets on a horse to win are
labelled "back" bets, and bets on a horse to lose are labelled "lay" bets. (A bettor laying a
horse is allowing their counterparty to back the horse.) Bettors are also able to wager on a
horse to place (a horse places if they do not win but finish in a high-ranking position).
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The Betfair exchange operates as a standard limit order book. This means that bettors
can provide quotes (where they specify the odds), or execute their bets at odds quoted by
others. When a bettor provides a quote, this is labelled a "limit order," and when a bettor
trades at a quote provided by another bettor, this is labelled a "market order." These betting
options reflect a widening of choice for punters. Prior to the inception of these types of
exchanges, bettors could only take long positions on a horse to win or place, and could only
execute at prices quoted by a bookmaker. Now each bettor can submit quotes themselves.2
Figure 2 provides a screenshot of the Betfair limit order book. This example is taken
from the 13.45 race at Wolverhampton on April 29, 2015, a race outside of our sample. All
back bet quotes (wagering on a horse to win) can be found on the left, with all lay bet quotes
(betting on the horse to lose) on the right. The best back and lay quotes are nearest the
center. Prices on the exchange are quoted in the form of odds. Odds of 7, as quoted on Black
Truﬄe for example, would return 7 GBP for every 1 GBP staked if the horse in question won.
If the horse did not win, the trader that quoted that limit order would pocket the amount
staked by their counterparty.
Horses are listed in each market from the expected favorites (those with the lowest odds)
at the top, to the expected longshots at the bottom. Bettors who wish to provide quotes
can specify the direction of their bet (back or lay), the odds that they wish to offer (or
request), and the volume involved in the bet. If these specific requirements are not fully met
by existing quotes, then the punter’s quote enters the book as a limit order.
2Betfair also operate a parallel service, the Sportsbook, where they operate as a traditional bookmaker.
The service is intended for less popular sporting events, where liquidity on the main exchange may be limited.
Historical data for Betfair’s Sportsbook pricing are not available.
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The pricing grid, which determines the precision of quotes, becomes more coarse for higher
odds. For example, odds can be quoted in increments of 0.01 between 1 and 2 (i.e., 1.01, 1.02
and so on), but only in increments of 0.02 between 2 and 3.3 The increased coarseness of
the pricing grid for higher odds is one reason why we choose fewer round numbers for higher
odds (more on this in Section 4). If a bettor enters an impermissible quote, such as 2.01 for
example, then the exchange automatically rounds up the quote to the nearest permissible
number (in this case, 2.02). As with quotes at permissible odds, the bettor can then decide
whether to proceed with the bet or not.4
Once a quote is in the book, other bettors can take the other side of the bet. However,
if a bet has not yet been taken, the bettor providing the quote is free to cancel or update
the price and volume that they wish to bet. This freedom is particularly important during
races, as quotes will quickly become outdated.
The data in this paper are sourced from Fracsoft, a third-party vendor of Betfair limit
order book data. We have chosen to study two prominent horse race meetings across two
3Odds are quoted in increments of 0.05 between 3 and 4, of 0.1 between 4 and 6, of 0.2 between 6 and 10,
of 0.5 between 10 and 20, of 1 between 20 and 30, of 2 between 30 and 50, of 5 between 50 and 100, and of
10 between 100 and 1000.
4It is possible that Betfair’s procedure for dealing with impermissible odds contributes to the increase in
the frequency of round numbers quoted during races. If bettors are more likely to make mistakes in-running
— and quote impermissible odds — then we will see quotes of 2.99, for example, rounded up to 3 (our
designated round number) rather than rounded down to 2.98 (our designated nearest neighbor). However,
this potential confound should not be such an issue when we designate 2 as our round number, and 1.99 as
our nearest neighbor. Without going beyond 2 decimal places, and therefore expecting payment in a fraction
of pennies, it is not possible for bettors to enter an impermissible quote in this range. And, as we shall see
in Table 6, quotes of 2 still become much more likely than quotes of 1.99 during races.
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years. We examine the premier flat racing meeting in the U.K., Royal Ascot, which takes
place in June each year, and also the premier jump racing event, the Cheltenham Festival,
which takes place in March each year. Royal Ascot lasts for five days, with six races per day,
while the Cheltenham Festival lasts for four days, with seven races per day.5 At least 394
horses take part in each of these meetings.
For this study, we examine the odds available on a horse to win and also the odds on a
horse to place. These odds are displayed in separate markets. For every horse, the best-priced
quotes are sampled every second for 20 minutes prior to each race (the pre-running phase),
and every second for the full duration of each race (the in-running phase). As there is a
30-40 minute gap between the start times of each race, pre-race bettors are not distracted by
the running of a previous race. Immediately prior to the beginning of each race, the market
is suspended for a few seconds and all quotes are canceled by the exchange. The market is
then reopened as the race begins, and quotes can then begin to fill the book once more. This
means that there are no stale pre-race quotes leftover during the in-running period.
4 Analysis
Betfair allow for quotes from 1.01 (i.e., 1 penny returned for each pound staked), to 1000
(999 pounds returned for each pound staked). We classify the round numbers in this study
as 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50. This includes the majority of horses
that are in contention, but not so certain to win or place that pricing their bets becomes a
5Data are available on the Fracsoft database for all days, except June 17, 2011 and June 19, 2012, both
at Ascot.
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simple exercise. The round numbers reflect implied probabilities from 0.5 (odds of 2), to 0.02
(odds of 50). We pick fewer round numbers from 10 onwards as the pricing grid becomes
significantly more coarse at this point.
For back bets we classify the price immediately below each of these round numbers as the
nearest neighbors. These odds are 1.99, 2.98, 3.95, 4.9, 5.9, 6.8, 7.8, 8.8, 9.8, 14.5, 19.5, 29,
38, and 48. We pick the odds just below the round number as a control price because quotes
just above the round number could become prevalent because of undercutting. To be specific,
a cognitively constrained trader may quote a round number because of its role as a cognitive
reference point but be immediately undercut by another (perhaps algorithmic) trader simply
using the initial quote as a reference point and improving upon it. In Figure 1 there is visible
tapering of the frequency of quotes to the right of a round number, particularly during races,
which suggests that systematic undercutting does take place. For the nearest neighbors of
lay bets, we consider the odds immediately above the round number, as undercutting on lay
bets will work in the opposite direction. This means odds of 2.02, 3.05, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 7.2, 8.2,
9.2, 10.5, 15.5, 21, 32, 42, and 55.
Before we proceed, we should clarify why we are interested in the prevalence of round
numbers relative only to their nearest neighbors, rather than relative to all other numbers.
The main issue is that the distribution of prices (odds) changes greatly between pre-race and
in-running periods. Prior to the races in our four meetings, 80.4% of back quotes can be
found in the interval between 2 and 50, our smallest and largest designated round numbers.
Contrast this with the in-running period, when only 68.7% of back quotes can be found in
the interval between 2 and 50. As each race nears completion, the imminent winners will be
quoted at 1.01 (if at all), and the imminent losers will be quoted at 1000 (if at all). This
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means that non-round numbers, which are outside of our range between 2 and 50, will likely
increase in prevalence during races, simply because horses drift to extreme odds and the
fundamental value of the bet either becomes very low or very high.
With this change in the distribution of odds in mind, we wanted to find appropriate odds
to compare to our round numbers. We therefore choose only the odds closest to the round
numbers, their nearest neighbors. Round numbers and their nearest neighbors reflect almost
identical win probabilities and therefore, in the absence of cognitive constraints, we should
be just as likely to observe a round number as its nearest neighbor. This argument applies
both pre-race and in-running. The result is that if a round number becomes more prevalent
than its nearest neighbor during races, after controling for any differences pre-race, we can
more reliably apportion this effect to limited cognition.
By comparing the incidence of round numbers only to their nearest neighbors, we also
reduce the importance of our choice of round numbers. We choose every whole number from
2 to 10, as many horses will find themselves quoted in this range, and then taper the number
of round numbers from then on (15, 20, 30, 40 and 50), as the pricing grid becomes more
coarse for higher odds. One might ask, however, why not 25? Any why not 100, or 200?
And going the other way, why not 1.1 through to 1.9, as these numbers are round compared
to 1.11 and 1.91? A case could be put for each of these numbers, but the important thing is
that by comparing our round numbers only to their nearest neighbors, we negate the effect
of any drift in fundamental values during races. A quote of 50, for example, could perhaps
become more likely as races progress and horses drop out of contention, but, in the absence
of cognitive constraints, such a price is almost equally likely as a price of 48 or 55. Similarly
a quote of 2 may become more likely as a horse nears the finish line in the lead, but, again,
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in the absence of cognitive constraints, such a quote should be just as likely as a quote of
1.99 or 2.02.
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics on the four race meetings separately. We
examine the percentage of seconds where there is at least one quote, and the percentage of
seconds where there is a round number quote, or a nearest neighbor quote. These percentages
are compared for back and lay bets, and for pre-race and in-running phases.
First, it is apparent that liquidity declines, particularly on the lay side, during races.
For example, we only have lay quotes 54.96% of the time for the win market at Royal
Ascot in 2011 during races. Second, across both markets, and across all events, the pre-race
proportion of round numbers and nearest neighbors is approximately 10%. Once we evaluate
in-running data, however, there are marked differences between the two markets. While the
proportion of round numbers and nearest neighbors declines slightly in the win market, there
are substantial increases in round numbers in the place market. As argued above, round
numbers and nearest neighbors can be found in the central mass of the implied probability
distribution. Therefore, once a race begins, the probability that a horse wins drifts towards
the tails — either as victory becomes likely, or defeat inevitable — thereby leaving fewer
observations at round numbers or nearest neighbors. This does not necessarily occur in the
place market, where a greater proportion of horses may remain in contention for much of
the race. These summary statistics illustrate why it is sensible to compare the frequency of
round numbers, not with all other quotes, but only with their nearest neighbors.
The analysis that follows therefore excludes all quotes except the round numbers and
their nearest neighbors. This means discarding a great deal of data. For example, the Royal
Ascot 2011 place market data includes 720,880 observations, which is reduced to 114,967
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when we consider only round numbers and their nearest neighbors. By focusing on this
small set of numbers, we are only picking quotes that reflect almost identical win or place
probabilities. For example, odds of 4 in the win market imply a win probability of 0.25, while
the nearest neighbor odds of 3.98 reflect an implied win probability of 0.251. Therefore, we
assume that "nature" is almost equally likely to draw a horse with a win probability of 0.25
as one with a probability of 0.251. The key difference is that one of the odds is a round
number — and therefore, we hypothesise, more likely to be latched onto by the cognitively
constrained bettor — and one is not. To ensure that limited cognition is indeed behind the
use of round numbers, we then exploit variation in the cognitive load facing traders. This
variation is created by the running of each race, and the resultant need to process rapidly
arriving information and price bets in a short space of time.
Table 2 presents the results of the main analysis. We regress an indicator variable equaling
1 if a round number (previously defined) is quoted, on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the
race was in-running at that stage. The results for back quotes are in Panels A and B. Only
data on round numbers, and the odds immediately below (nearest neighbors) are included.
A logit specification is used, and random effects are included for each horse (bet) in the
sample.6 In Panel A we include win market data, with place market data in Panel B. These
regressions are carried out for Royal Ascot in 2011 and 2012, and the Cheltenham Festival
in 2011 and 2012. The coefficient associated with the intercept term suggests that there is
a small baseline prevalence for quoting round numbers for back bets. The treatment effect,
6In addition to this specification, we also checked the results with two-way clustering of standard errors,
albeit without random effects, when the two clusters were the bet and the race, and also when the two clusters
were the bet and the time. Our results are qualitatively similar to those that we present.
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however, captured by the in-running indicator, is of greater importance. We find that as races
begin there is a large and significant increase in the propensity to quote a round number,
for place markets, and a smaller increase for win markets (all significant at the 0.1% level).
This is the case across all four horse race meetings. The coefficients imply an odds ratio of
between 1.29 (Royal Ascot 2012, win market) and 5.25 (Cheltenham 2012, place market) of
observing a round number quote in-running relative to prior to races. This treatment effect
suggests that the clustering of quotes at round numbers is indeed a manifestation of limited
cognition.7
In the bottom half of Table 2, we show the results of an analysis for quotes on the lay
side of the bet. We regress an indicator variable equaling 1 if a lay bet was quoted at a
round number, on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the race was in-running at that point.
Win (place) market data are in Panel C (Panel D), a logit specification is used, and random
effects for each horse (bet) are included. The intercept term suggests that lay quotes are
more likely to be nearest neighbors than round numbers prior to races. If you have a back
bet at a round number, the lay bet cannot be at the same round number (otherwise the two
bets will execute with each other, and immediately disappear from the book). Therefore, if
a bettor quotes the minimum spread (as is common prior to races), we are likely to observe
many lay bets at nearest neighbors, purely as a result of the observed tendency to quote back
7At this stage we should clarify why there are differences in the number of random effects (bets) in win and
place markets for the same meeting (e.g., Ascot, 2011). As we are only using the quotes at round numbers
or nearest neighbors, a bet is only incorporated in our analysis if, at some point pre-race or in-running, it
is priced at one of these figures. We are likely to see more bets in our place market analyses than our win
market analyses, as place odds are more likely to be in the middle of the implied win probability distribution,
where most of our round numbers and nearest neighbors are found.
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bets at round numbers. Once races begin however, and spreads widen, this mechanical effect
is not present. For all four events, and both markets, a pronounced in-running propensity to
quote round numbers is observed (with statistical significance at the 0.1% level).
In the next section, we examine the robustness of our results, and whether there are
convincing alternative explanations for the prevalence of round number quotes during races.
5 Robustness tests
Our first concern at this stage of our analysis is that, due to the prevalence of undercutting,
for back bets we have exclusively chosen nearest neighbors that are priced just below the
round number. Therefore, we may be confounding the limited cognition effect with subtle
drifts in the odds that occur when a race begins. As the majority of horses do not win or
place, most will see their odds increase during the in-running period. Therefore a comparison
of the frequency of, for example, odds of 2.98 and 3 could find slightly more 3s when races
are under way, as horses that were hitherto priced at 2.98 slowly drift out of contention.
To deal with this problem, we run a series of placebo tests on the four race meetings.
For these tests, we define the original nearest neighbors — 1.99, 2.98, 3.95, 4.9, 5.9, 6.8, 7.8,
8.8, 9.8, 14.5, 19.5, 29, 38, and 48 — as the "placebo" round numbers for our analysis of
back quotes. We then create new nearest neighbors just one price down. These new nearest
neighbors are 1.98, 2.96, 3.9, 4.8, 5.8, 6.6, 7.6, 8.6, 9.6, 14, 19, 28, 36, and 46. If our results for
back bets can be apportioned to a general drift in the odds during races, we should observe a
similar effect when we repeat the analysis with these odds. We also conduct placebo tests for
lay quotes. Here we potentially have the opposite issue. Perhaps there is a drift down in odds
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during races (this may be more of an issue in place markets as more horses place than win),
which we have attributed to limited cognition because our round numbers are lower than our
nearest neighbors for lay quotes. We therefore reclassify our nearest neighbors for lay quotes
— 2.02, 3.05, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 7.2, 8.2, 9.2, 10.5, 15.5, 21, 32, 42, and 55 — as "placebo" round
numbers, and create new nearest neighbors at the following odds: 2.04, 3.1, 4.2, 5.2, 6.4, 7.4,
8.4, 9.4, 11, 16, 22, 34, 44, and 60. If our lay quote results are due to a drift down in odds
as races progress, we should observe a similar effect here.
Table 3 presents the results of a regression where an indicator variable equaling 1 if
a placebo round number is quoted, is regressed on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the
race in question was in-running at that stage. Only placebo round numbers, and the odds
immediately below them (for back quotes) or above (for lay quotes), are included in the
regressions. As before, a logit specification is used, and random effects for each horse (bet)
are included. Back quote analysis is in the top half, with lay quote analysis in the bottom
half. Win (place) market data can be found in Panels A and C (Panels B and D). Firstly, we
will discuss the back quote results. Judging by the eight regression results in the top half of
Table 3, one for each market in each race meeting, there is little evidence that the in-running
effect we observed in Table 2 is due to a subtle drift upwards in the odds in-running. In
fact, the coefficients associated with the in-running indicator are negative and significant,
albeit quite small. This indicates that the round numbers absorb such a high proportion of
their nearest neighbors that these neighbors are slightly less likely to arise than other non-
round numbers. For the lay quote analysis, there are two instances when the placebo effect
is positive — for the place market for Ascot 2011 and 2012 — but overall the majority of
placebo estimates are negative. These results re-affirm the impression that limited cognition
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was driving the increase in round number quotes during races observed in Table 2, rather
than drifts in the distribution of odds.
At this stage we have accounted for any subtle drifts in the distribution of odds during
races, but perhaps there are more drastic shifts in both the mean and variance of the distri-
bution of odds that are affecting our results. Ideally we would like to compare the frequency
of round number quotes pre-race and in-running, while broadly holding the distribution of
odds fixed. Unfortunately, this is difficult, as odds drift to the extremes (1.01 and 1000)
during races as uncertainty is resolved and horses near victory or defeat. (Incidentally, this
is one reason why we did not choose 1000 as a round number as odds would mechanically
gravitate to this number during races, as it is the highest.)
There is, however, a matching approach that we can take to deal with this issue. Firstly,
we calculate the mean and standard deviation of the odds, for each market, for each race,
in each second. This gives us two moments of the distribution of the odds at a given time.
We then match every pre-race odds observation (at a round number or nearest neighbor),
with an in-running observation (at a round number or nearest neighbor), which was quoted
when the distribution of odds (including all prices at that time-point) were similar. We then
ask whether round numbers are more common pre-race or in-running, amongst this matched
sample. In other words, we are comparing the frequency of round number quotes, relative to
their nearest neighbors, while (almost) holding the distribution — or at least the first two
moments of the distribution — fixed. This matching procedure, which is described in Abadie
and Imbens (2011), matches on the basis of the Mahalanobis distance between the matching
variables (in our case the mean and standard deviation of odds at that timepoint), and is
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known as nearest neighbor matching.8 However, we will refer to it as simply "matching" so
as not to confuse it with our use of the term "nearest neighbors" (the prices closest to round
numbers).
In order to understand the effect that a changing distribution of odds may be having
on our results, we also estimate a linear probability model, where the estimates are more
directly comparable to the matching estimates than our earlier logit regressions. For the
linear probability model, estimated by OLS, we regress an indicator variable equaling 1 if a
round number is quoted, on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the race was in-running at
that stage. As before, only round numbers and their nearest neighbors are included in the
regressions.
Our matching and linear probability model estimation results are in Table 4. We display
only the coefficient associated with the in-running indicator. We breakdown the analysis, by
event, market, and back/lay quote. While we use all quoted odds to calculate the mean and
standard deviation of the odds at a given time, to give us a sense of the distribution of odds at
the time, we still only incorporate round numbers and their nearest neighbors to estimate the
in-running effect. We find that even after accounting for changes in the distribution of odds
as races begin, there is still a heightened tendency to quote round numbers during the races.
8Ideally, we would like to match on higher moments of the distribution of odds as well, particularly
skewness, but the more matching variables we include the more difficult it becomes to find appropriate
pre-race observations to compare with our in-running observations. Similarly, we would like to ensure that
we match only within the same bet (i.e., one observation for a given bet pre-race matched with another
observation for the same bet during the race) but this is problematic as there may not be times during races
when the distribution looks at all similar to how it did pre-race. We therefore have to allow for matches
across bets.
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As an example, it is worth examining the results for back quotes in the win market for Ascot
2011, the first results in Panel A. Using the linear probability model, we estimate that round
number quotes increase in frequency by 10.7% more than nearest neighbors (one price down)
during races compared to pre-race. Yet, once we match pre-race and in-running observations
according to the distribution of odds at the time, we find that round numbers still increase in
frequency by 6.8% more than their nearest neighbors. A similar pattern emerges for the other
markets, events, and quotes. Only in one case — back quotes in the win market for Ascot
2012 — is the in-running effect deemed insignificant when the changes in the distribution of
odds are accounted for. In three cases, the in-running effect is actually larger once changes
in the distribution of odds are acknowledged. It is likely that by considering only round
numbers or nearest neighbors in our earlier analysis, we have largely mitigated any problems
that may emerge due to changes in the distribution of odds during races.
We next examine the drivers of increased clustering during races. The interpretation taken
throughout the paper is that a cognitively constrained trader uses round numbers as a short-
cut pricing method. If more time and mental capacity had been available, a more precise
quote may have been provided. An alternative interpretation is that the trader submitting
the limit order (i.e., providing the quote) submits a round number to take advantage of
the limited processing capabilities of other traders during races. In other words, limit order
traders believe that market order traders will spy relative value in a back quote of 2, compared
to 1.99, when races go in-running, because their limited cognition does not allow them to
spot the similarities between the two prices. The empirical prediction of such a hypothesis is
that the frequency of orders should jump at round numbers, relative to nearest neighbor non-
round numbers, and jump specifically during races when traders are cognitively constrained.
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This argument only applies to back quotes, as round numbers and nearest neighbors have
the same left-digit for lay quotes (e.g., in the case of 2 and 2.02).9
Table 5 presents the results of a regression where an indicator variable equaling 1 if a
(back) order was observed in the last second, is regressed on an indicator variable equaling
1 if a round number was quoted in the previous second, an indicator variable equaling 1
if the race was in-running, and an interaction between the two aforementioned indicators.
The interaction term is crucial as this captures the extent to which market order traders fail
to identify the similarities between round number and nearest neighbor quotes, specifically
during races. Only data on round numbers, and the odds immediately below (back quote
nearest neighbors) are included in this regression. As before, a logit specification is used and
random effects are included for each horse (bet). This regression is carried out for win and
place market data for the four horse race meetings.
There are three results from Table 5 to be discussed. Firstly, in all eight cases, quotes at
round numbers are slightly more likely to attract an order. This is consistent with a left-digit
bias, but if this was the result of interest, a placebo test would need to be conducted to ensure
that this is not simply picking up the fact that higher odds attract more frequent back orders.
The second result is that orders decline as races begin. Finally, and most importantly, there is
no evidence that the propensity for orders to arrive for round number quotes increases during
9The left-digit bias is not a potential explanation for the prevalence of round number lay quotes during
races. If a limit order trader suspects that market order traders did not process the digits of a figure beyond
its first left-digit, then they would likely quote 2.02, for example, rather than 2, in order to extract higher odds
from their cognitively constrained counterparty. However, we observe that quotes of 2 are more common,
during races, than 2.02, when it comes to lay quotes.
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races. The coefficient is negative and significant for five of the regressions, and insignificant
for the other three. In other words, rather than a tactic to induce orders from constrained
counterparties, the round number appears to be used as a heuristic method for pricing bets
when finer information processing is not feasible.
We next examine the breadth of the in-running effect documented throughout the paper.
While the effect is robust across markets, across events, and across time (at least from 2011
to 2012), it would be instructive to examine whether the effect is robust across all of the
round numbers we have specified. To this end, we pool the win and place market data, as
well as the data for Royal Ascot and the Cheltenham Festival in both years. This gives the
following tests substantial statistical power. We repeat the analysis of Table 2 with back
quotes and lay quotes for each individual round number and present the results in Table 6.
When looking at the in-running effect at the round number of 3, only quotes of 3 and 2.98
are included for back quotes, and only quotes of 3 and 3.05 are included for lay quotes. The
results show that the propensity to quote a round number, relative to a nearest neighbor
non-round number, increases as races go in-running for all 14 round numbers used for back
quotes, and for 13 of the 14 for lay quotes (with significance at the 0.1% level). The number
15 is the exception for lay quotes. Although the size of the effect is not monotonic with the
size of the odds, there is some evidence that the greatest propensity to quote round numbers
— both pre-race and in-running, and for both back and lay quotes — is found for lower round
numbers, particular those from 2 to 5.
One argument that may be put forward is that the increased incidence of round numbers
during races is not due to limited cognition, but is instead due to another factor that arises
due to time-pressure. Bettors may quote round numbers during races as, in most cases, round
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numbers require the inputting of fewer digits. In other words, rather than enter 1.99 as the
quote for a back bet, a punter enters 2, which is almost the same price, to save entering the
two digits that follow the decimal place. Such a shortcut allows the bettor to update their
quotes, and secure trade, much more quickly. While speed is not so important prior to races,
it is during races.
To deal with such a concern, we take advantage of the fact that a subset of the round
numbers in our analysis has the same number of digits as their nearest neighbors. For 15,
20, 30, 40 and 50, the nearest neighbors are 14, 19, 28, 36, and 46 respectively. In other
words, it takes just as much time to input the round number price as the nearest neighbor. In
contrast, round numbers of 10 and below involve fewer inputs than their nearest neighbors.
(In the case of 10, there are two characters inputted for the round number, and 3 characters
for the nearest neighbor, 9.6.) Therefore, we argue that the treatment effect for higher round
numbers — from 15 to 50 — can be more reliably attributed to limited cognition.
With this in mind, in Table 7 we present the results of four further regressions; two
for back quotes (in Panel A) and two for lay quotes (in Panel B). We retain the pooled
data from the Table 6 analysis, to ensure the greatest statistical power, and break the full
sample down into low round numbers (2 to 10) and high round numbers (15 to 50). We
then repeat the regressions of Table 2. We find that both low and high round numbers are
more prevalent than their nearest neighbors, particularly during races. The running of each
race does increase the incidence of lower round numbers to a greater extent than high round
numbers, suggesting that limited time to input digits may well be a factor. However, the
effect for high round numbers is still highly significant, leading us to believe that limited
cognition is a contributor to the clustering of asset prices at round numbers.
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We have argued that bettors latch on to round numbers when the cognitive load is greater
during races. This implicitly assumes that round numbers are more frequently quoted than
their nearest neighbors, rather than simply being more persistent.10 However, in all of our
analysis thus far, we have considered the best back and lay quotes each second, irrespective
of whether the quote was also present in the previous second. For our final analysis, we
therefore repeat the main analysis, but this time only consider quotes if they are "new," (i.e.,
were not the best quote in the previous second). (We cannot observe each individual limit
order placed, so this is the best way, in our opinion, to classify a new order.) The results are
in Table 8. We also display the results for the full sample including both new and old quotes
for comparison. In the case of back and lay quotes, the effect is slightly larger for all quotes
than for just new quotes, thereby hinting that round number quotes are more persistent than
nearest neighbors, but the in-running effect remains large and highly significant (at the 0.1%
level) even when we consider only new quotes. This applies to both back and lay quotes,
and gives us confidence that cognitively constrained bettors are indeed latching on to round
numbers more frequently than nearest neighbor prices.
6 Conclusion
Asset prices tend to cluster at round numbers. This clustering is found in stock prices,
currency prices (Sopranzetti and Datar, 2002), bond prices (Gwilym, Clare, and Thomas,
1998a), and option prices (Gwilym, Clare, and Thomas, 1998b). Furthermore, clustering
10This may itself be a sign of limited cognition (i.e., cognitively constrained traders are more likely to quote
round numbers, and are also slower to update these quotes, and hence round numbers are more persistent).
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appears to be resistant to changes in market design. Ikenberry and Weston (2007) find
little decrease in clustering after the decimalization of prices (i.e., prices had previously been
quoted in coarser dollar fractions) on the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ in
2001. This would suggest that the use of round numbers is a "hard-wired" reflex action for
the cognitively constrained trader.
Missing from this story, however, is any evidence that the level of clustering varies with
the cognitive load facing traders. If limited cognition is truly behind price clustering, we
should observe particularly pronounced levels of clustering when traders are under an intense
cognitive load. Rather than test such an idea in the laboratory, where the experience of
subjects may be in some doubt, we use data arising from horse race betting on a U.K.
betting exchange to test this hypothesis. Information in this market is produced in such a
way that there is stark variation in the cognitive load facing traders. Prior to races there
is little new information to process, and bettors can therefore make fine price distinctions.
Once the race begins, however, and horses switch positions frequently, information must be
processed — and bets newly priced — in a very short space of time. We hypothesise that
round numbers will become more prevalent in this latter period.
To tease out such an effect, we use an empirical approach based partly on regression
discontinuity (RD) methods, and partly on difference-in-differences (DID) methods. We
compare the propensity for traders to quote round numbers with their propensity to quote
the nearest non-round number. These two prices reflect almost identical values and therefore,
if bettors had unlimited cognition, each price should be equally likely to be quoted (or
"assigned," to use the RD parlance). Unlike RD analysis, we are not interested in the outcome
for the assigned and unassigned variables, but instead we are interested in how the assignment
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decision varies across pre-race (pre-treatment) periods, and in-running (treatment) periods.
If bettors display a greater propensity to quote round numbers rather than their nearest
neighbors during races — when the cognitive load is greater — this puts limited cognition
front-and-center as an explanation for the clustering of asset prices.
We find a significant and substantial increase in the proportion of round number quotes
during races. The results are robust to a series of placebo tests (and matching exercises) to
deal with changes in the distribution of odds as races progress. The results also apply when
inputting a round number requires as much effort as entering a nearest neighbor (i.e., when
the round number has the same number of digits as its neighbor). In short, we find that
limited cognition does indeed lead to asset price clustering.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Royal Ascot 2011
Win Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 97.26% 12.28% 9.82%
Lay Odds 97.18% 9.96% 12.14%
In-Running Back Odds 98.15% 8.01% 4.07%
Lay Odds 54.96% 6.66% 5.71%
Place Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 97.26% 12.20% 9.18%
Lay Odds 97.26% 10.80% 11.04%
In-Running Back Odds 96.45% 20.20% 4.07%
Lay Odds 76.45% 13.93% 10.60%
Panel B: Royal Ascot 2012
Win Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 96.08% 12.90% 9.99%
Lay Odds 95.20% 10.21% 12.90%
In-Running Back Odds 95.43% 10.98% 6.87%
Lay Odds 76.22% 9.01% 6.82%
Place Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 96.08% 10.95% 9.42%
Lay Odds 96.08% 10.80% 10.17%
In-Running Back Odds 94.65% 16.54% 4.76%
Lay Odds 66.33% 9.99% 4.81%
Panel C: Cheltenham Festival 2011
Win Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 98.62% 12.34% 9.66%
Lay Odds 98.36% 9.87% 12.33%
In-Running Back Odds 98.38% 10.13% 6.69%
Lay Odds 77.89% 8.76% 7.20%
Place Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 98.58% 11.76% 10.23%
Lay Odds 98.58% 12.39% 10.53%
In-Running Back Odds 98.04% 18.79% 5.23%
Lay Odds 70.24% 12.58% 6.67%
Panel D: Cheltenham Festival 2012
Win Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 98.34% 11.59% 9.37%
Lay Odds 97.63% 9.59% 11.50%
In-Running Back Odds 98.11% 10.02% 6.37%
Lay Odds 77.31% 8.63% 7.46%
Place Market Quotes Round Number Nearest Neighbor
Pre-Race Back Odds 98.34% 10.35% 9.91%
Lay Odds 98.34% 11.66% 9.53%
In-Running Back Odds 97.72% 19.04% 4.23%
Lay Odds 67.04% 14.18% 5.60%
The percentage of seconds with at least one quote, and the percentage of seconds with a quote at a round number or a nearest
neighbor. The round numbers are defined as 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50. The nearest neighbors are the odds
immediately below (for a back quote), or immediately above (for a lay quote). These statistics are compared for pre-race and
in-running trading periods. Data for the win and place market for Royal Ascot and the Cheltenham Festival in 2011 and 2012 are
displayed.
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Table 2: Main Test Results (Logit)
Panel A: Win Market (Back Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept 0.475*** 0.374*** 0.391*** 0.367***
(.066) (.072) (.065) (.057)
In-Running 0.442*** 0.253*** 0.281*** 0.255***
(.026) (.027) (.018) (.017)
No. of Observations 115,861 120,606 137,461 146,264
ρ 0.294 0.337 0.308 0.275
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 342 340 363 421
Panel B: Place Market (Back Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept 0.435*** 0.278*** 0.25*** 0.288***
(.061) (.056) (.055) (.056)
In-Running 1.437*** 1.237*** 1.334*** 1.666***
(.028) (.027) (.017) (.017)
No. of Observations 114,967 110,030 143,222 153,083
ρ 0.283 0.248 0.259 0.293
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 375 374 409 475
Panel C: Win Market (Lay Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept -0.316*** -0.275*** -0.269*** -0.249***
(.062) (.073) (.068) (.059)
In-Running 0.422*** 0.543*** 0.371*** 0.367***
(.025) (.028) (.018) (.017)
No. of Observations 116,033 120,723 137,335 146,558
ρ 0.27 0.334 0.32 0.285
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 331 325 351 404
Panel D: Place Market (Lay Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept 0.033 0.136* 0.281*** 0.418***
(.06) (.061) (.057) (.06)
In-Running 0.221*** 0.799*** 0.444*** 0.793***
(.023) (.03) (.017) (.017)
No. of Observations 117,309 109,829 141,700 153,074
ρ 0.278 0.279 0.275 0.327
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 372 369 408 472
The main test results in the paper. An indicator variable equaling 1 if a round number is quoted, is regressed
on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the race is ‘in-running’ at that time-point. The round numbers are defined
as 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Only quotes at these odds, or those immediately below
(for back quotes) or above (for lay quotes), are included in the regressions. Analysis is conducted separately
for win and place market data. A logit specification is used, random effects for each bet are included (with ρ
representing the variation in the dependent variable captured by these random effects), standard errors are in
parentheses, and *** and * indicates significance at the 0.1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Placebo Test Results (Logit)
Panel A: Win Market (Back Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Placebo Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept -0.076 0.084 0.068 0.011
(.06) (.058) (.052) (.045)
In-Running -0.197*** -0.244*** -0.187*** -0.063**
(.028) (.029) (.019) (.018)
No. of Observations 101,833 100,659 116,905 128,050
ρ 0.253 0.239 0.21 0.183
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 334 330 350 401
Panel B: Place Market (Back Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Placebo Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept -0.048 0.085 0.047 -0.099
(.056) (.054) (.051) (.056)
In-Running -0.19*** -0.205*** -0.091*** -0.081***
(.034) (.034) (.02) (.022)
No. of Observations 95,992 96,976 119,425 127,408
ρ 0.243 0.226 0.228 0.284
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 357 353 394 450
Panel C: Win Market (Lay Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Placebo Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept 0.265** 0.482*** 0.266** 0.322
(.078) (.092) (.08) (.07)
In-Running -0.068* -0.665*** -0.277*** -0.210***
(.026) (.031) (.02) (.019)
No. of Observations 116,836 111,127 131,843 142,333
ρ 0.373 0.448 0.407 0.366
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 332 330 364 408
Panel D: Place Market (Lay Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Placebo Round Number Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept 0.638*** 0.663*** 0.496*** 0.484***
(.096) (.113) (.083) (.095)
In-Running 0.412*** 0.147*** -0.143*** -0.271***
(.029) (.039) (.021) (.021)
No. of Observations 103,212 90,889 114,073 116,989
ρ 0.495 0.566 0.445 0.542
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 372 357 399 463
Placebo test results. An indicator variable equaling 1 if a placebo round number is quoted, is regressed on an
indicator variable equaling 1 if the race is ‘in-running’ at that time-point. The placebo round numbers are 1.99,
2.98, 3.95, 4.9, 5.9, 6.8, 7.8, 8.8, 9.8, 14.5, 19.5, 29, 38, and 48 for back quotes, and 2.02, 3.05, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 7.2,
8.2, 9.2, 10.5, 15.5, 21, 32, 42, and 55 for lay quotes. Only quotes at these odds, or those immediately below
(for back quotes) or above (for lay quotes), are included in the regressions. Analysis is conducted separately
for win and place market data. A logit specification is used, random effects for each bet are included (with ρ
representing the variation in the dependent variable captured by these random effects), standard errors are in
parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Matching on Odds Distribution
Panel A: Win Market (Back Quotes)
Event Matching In-Running Estimate LPM In-Running Estimate No. of Observations
Ascot 2011 0.068** 0.107*** 115,861
(.025) (.005)
Ascot 2012 0.041 0.051*** 120,606
(.028) (.005)
Cheltenham 2011 0.054* 0.041*** 137,461
(.022) (.003)
Cheltenham 2012 0.058*** 0.058*** 146,264
(.015) (.003)
Panel B: Place Market (Back Quotes)
Event Matching In-Running Estimate LPM In-Running Estimate No. of Observations
Ascot 2011 0.245*** 0.261*** 114,967
(.021) (.003)
Ascot 2012 0.196*** 0.238*** 110,030
(.021) (.004)
Cheltenham 2011 0.287*** 0.247*** 143,222
(.018) (.002)
Cheltenham 2012 0.291*** 0.307*** 153,083
(.016) (.002)
Panel C: Win Market (Lay Quotes)
Event Matching In-Running Estimate LPM In-Running Estimate No. of Observations
Ascot 2011 0.081*** 0.087*** 116,033
(.017) (.005)
Ascot 2012 0.097** 0.127*** 120,723
(.03) (.005)
Cheltenham 2011 0.088*** 0.104*** 137,335
(.015) (.003)
Cheltenham 2012 0.056*** 0.081*** 146,558
(.015) (.003)
Panel D: Place Market (Lay Quotes)
Event Matching In-Running Estimate LPM In-Running Estimate No. of Observations
Ascot 2011 0.113*** 0.073*** 117,309
(.017) (.004)
Ascot 2012 0.145*** 0.159*** 109,829
(.022) (.005)
Cheltenham 2011 0.106*** 0.112*** 141,700
(.017) (.003)
Cheltenham 2012 0.152*** 0.166*** 153,074
(.012) (.002)
Matching and linear probability model (LPM) estimates of the ‘in-running’ effect on the propensity to quote round numbers. In
the matching estimation, pre-race and in-running observations are matched with each other on the basis of the distribution (mean
and standard deviation) of odds in that race at that time. Matching is carried out with replacement (i.e., an observation pre-race
can be matched with more than one observation in-running, and vice-versa), and estimates are bias-corrected according to the
method in Abadie and Imbens (2011). In the linear probability model, with estimation by OLS, an indicator variable equaling 1
if a round number is quoted, is regressed on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the race is in-running at that time-point. Only
the coefficient associated with the in-running indicator, and not the intercept, is displayed. The round numbers are defined as 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Only quotes at these odds, or those immediately below (for back quotes) or above
(for lay quotes), are included in the two sets of estimations, but all observations are used to calculate the distribution (mean and
standard deviation) of the odds in the matching procedure. All analyses are carried out separately for win and place markets, and
back and lay quotes, across the four events. Standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicates significance at the
0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels, respectively.
33
Table 5: Left-Digit Bias Test Results (Logit)
Panel A: Win Market (Back Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Order Indicator Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept -0.544*** -0.486*** -0.377*** -0.2***
(.04) (.041) (.038) (.039)
Odds=Round Number 0.14*** 0.139*** 0.171*** 0.166***
(.014) (.0144) (.014) (.013)
In-Running -0.836*** -0.699*** -0.667*** -0.848***
(.045) (.042) (.026) (.026)
Odds=Round Number*In-Running 0.06 -0.137* -0.102** -0.064*
(.055) (.054) (.034) (.032)
No. of Observations 115,861 120,606 137,461 146,264
ρ 0.124 0.129 0.123 0.141
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 342 340 363 421
Panel B: Place Market (Back Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Order Indicator Ascot 2011 Ascot 2012 Cheltenham 2011 Cheltenham 2012
Intercept -1.957*** -1.867*** -1.903*** -1.671***
(.039) (.04) (.038) (.039)
Odds=Round Number 0.143*** 0.087*** 0.125*** 0.162***
(.02) (.02) (.019) (.017)
In-Running -0.601*** -1.044*** -0.81*** -0.907***
(.09) (.099) (.052) (.054)
Odds=Round Number*In-Running -0.33** 0.032 0.011 -0.226***
(.1) (.111) (.059) (.06)
No. of Observations 114,967 110,030 143,222 153,083
ρ 0.116 0.121 0.125 0.152
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 375 374 409 475
The results of tests for a left-digit bias amongst bettors. An indicator variable equaling 1 if a back order
was placed in the last second, was regressed on an indicator variable equaling 1 if a round number had been
quoted, an indicator equaling 1 if the race was ‘in-running’ at that time-point, and an interaction between the
two aforementioned indicators. The interaction term would capture any left-digit bias that arises specifically
during races. As before, the round numbers are defined as 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Only
quotes at these odds, or those immediately below, are included in the regressions. Win market data are in
Panel A and place market data are in Panel B. A logit specification is used, random effects for each horse (bet)
are included (with ρ representing the variation in the dependent variable captured by these random effects),
standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels,
respectively.
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Table 6: Individual Round Numbers (Logit)
Panel A: Win & Place Markets (Back Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Intercept 3.368*** 2.442*** 2.436*** 1.044*** 1.435*** 0.664*** 1.246***
(.335) (.167) (.148) (.103) (.091) (.095) (.099)
In-Running 1.271*** 1.276*** 0.56*** 1.233*** 0.647*** 0.46*** 0.458***
(.128) (.067) (.058) (.044) (.04) (.04) (.038)
No. of Observations 10,480 31,280 44,200 66,406 87,624 74,999 78,914
ρ 0.678 0.614 0.726 0.622 0.578 0.631 0.645
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 449 702 803 944 944 891 958
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number 9 10 15 20 30 40 50
Intercept 0.699*** 1.451*** 0.133. 1.182*** 0.677*** 0.149*** 0.966***
(.082) (.084) (.068) (.079) (.074) (.078) (.102)
In-Running 0.125** 0.315*** 0.491*** 0.256*** 0.132*** 0.151*** 0.448***
(.039) (.038) (.036) (.036) (.033) (.034) (.036)
No. of Observations 70,910 98,268 90,771 95,757 107,624 82,719 101,542
ρ 0.553 0.565 0.487 0.547 0.535 0.534 0.663
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 884 1,008 961 1,011 939 872 892
Panel B: Win & Place Markets (Lay Quotes)
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Intercept 1.38*** 0.657*** 0.357** 0.669*** 0.017 0.386*** 0.557***
(.205) (.132) (.123) (.103) (.091) (.095) (.092)
In-Running 0.834*** 1.146*** 1.104*** 0.812*** 0.755*** 0.544*** 0.696***
(.093) (.052) (.052) (.038) (.033) (.039) (.04)
No. of Observations 9,674 29,671 42,046 63,857 90,338 73,190 74,128
ρ 0.609 0.61 0.663 0.624 0.610 0.615 0.610
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 354 523 643 739 821 786 842
Dep. Var.: Odds=Round Number 9 10 15 20 30 40 50
Intercept 0.415*** -0.018 0.654*** -0.052 -0.238** 0.470*** -0.733***
(.087) (.086) (.085) (.084) (.076) (.081) (.099)
In-Running 0.689*** 0.817*** -0.090** 0.326*** 0.384*** 0.211*** 0.439***
(.045) (.033) (.038) (.033) (.031) (.036) (.035)
No. of Observations 68,278 103,051 87,689 99,867 111,799 80,733 108,240
ρ 0.565 0.603 0.593 0.613 0.564 0.565 0.707
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 790 920 887 980 962 903 1,075
A repeat of the regressions used to generate the results in Table 2, but this time run for each individual round number, and
including pooled win and place market data for all four meetings. Back quote results are in Panel A with lay quote results in
Panel B. An indicator variable equaling 1 if a round number is quoted, is regressed on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the race
is "in-running" at that time-point. The round numbers are defined as 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40 and 50. Only quotes
at these odds, or those immediately below (for back quotes) or above (for lay quotes), are included in the regressions. A logit
specification is used, random effects for each (horse) bet are included (with ρ representing the variation in the dependent variable
captured by these random effects), standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, **, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Low and High Round Numbers (Logit)
Panel A: Win & Place Markets (Back Quotes)





No. of Observations 563,081 478,413
ρ 0.315 0.369
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 1,994 1,775
Panel B: Win & Place Markets (Lay Quotes)





No. of Observations 554,233 488,328
ρ 0.3 0.451
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 1,802 1,880
A repeat of the regressions used to generate the results in Table 2, but this time run separately
for low and high round numbers, and including pooled win and place market data for all four
meetings. Back quote results are in Panel A, with lay quote results in Panel B. An indicator
variable equaling 1 if a round number is quoted is regressed on an indicator variable equaling 1
if the race is "in-running" at that time-point. The low round numbers are defined as 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, and the high round numbers are 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Only quotes at these
odds, or those immediately below (for back quotes) or above (for lay quotes), are included in
the regressions. A logit specification is used, random effects for each horse (bet) are included
(with ρ representing the variation in the dependent variable captured by these random effects),
standard errors are in parentheses, and *** indicates significance at the 0.1% level.
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Table 8: New Quotes (Logit)
Panel A: Win & Place Markets (Back Quotes)





No. of Observations 1,041,494 101,214
ρ 0.278 0.032
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 2,732 2,732
Panel B: Win & Place Markets (Lay Quotes)





No. of Observations 1,042,561 89,261
ρ 0.296 0.024
No. of Random Effects (Bets) 2,673 2,673
A repeat of the regressions used to generate the results in Table 2, but this time run only for
new quotes (i.e., those not the best quote in the previous second), and including pooled win
and place market data for all four meetings. Back quote results are in Panel A, with lay quote
results in Panel B. An indicator variable equaling 1 if a round number is quoted is regressed
on an indicator variable equaling 1 if the race is "in-running" at that timepoint. The round
numbers are defined as 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Only quotes at these
odds, or those immediately below (for back quotes) or above (for lay quotes), are included in
the regressions. In the first regression, all quotes are analyzed, but in the second regression
only new quotes are analyzed. A logit specification is used, random effects for each horse (bet)
are included (with ρ representing the variation in the dependent variable captured by these
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Figure 1: Quoted Odds. Bar charts of quoted win and place odds (back quotes) on horses
in races at Royal Ascot in 2011. Panel A contains pre-race odds and Panel B contains
in-running odds. The plot is restricted to odds (including the stake) of below 11.
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Figure 2: Betfair Screenshot. A pre-race screenshot from the Betfair limit order book for
the 13.45 race at Wolverhampton on Wednesday April 29, 2015 (an example outside of our
sample). To bet on a horse to win, the punter would place a "back" bet on the left, and to
bet against a horse, the punter would place a "lay" bet on the right. The best back and lay
quotes are displayed, for each horse, in the center. The volumes available at each price are
indicated underneath the odds.
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